Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1957

G. T. Rummel et al v. K. R. Bailey, Jr. et al : Reply
Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Therald N. Jensen; Eugene H. Mast; Senior & Senior; Attorneys for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Rummel v. Bailey, No. 8622 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2755

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

f UJilYERS\n'~ UTAH.
--p: "I 11<3 r:;-9580
No. 8622

;

B

Mlt r~·

~

I

~ r;Ui_~ ~~-,

-~----------1---. 4~·
'tjerk~-Pt~~--c~~#:-*t;:'~ -----.·
G. T. RUMMEL, et al., APPELLANTS
(PLAINTIFFS)
K. R. BAILEY, JR., et al., RESPONDENTS
(DEFENDANTS)

Reply Brief of
Appellants
THERALD N. JENSEN
EUGENE H. MAST
SENIOR & SENIOR
Attorneys for .Appellants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pag.e
INTRODUCTORY

1

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A
VALID DISCOVERY HAD BEEN MADE ON DEFENDANTS' MAYBE NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, AND RED
FRY NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4 CLAIMS OR ON ANY OF THEM
PRIOR TO JULY 24, 1953·----------------------------------------------------------II. PLAINTIFFS PROVED THE VALIDITY OF THEIR
RED CANYON NO. 6 AND NO. 9 CLAIMS____________________________
III.

5
29

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS INVALID BECAUSE OF FRAUD____________

36

CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

45

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co.,
106 P. 673 (Wyo.)--------------------·------------------------------------------------------43
Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286; 40 S. Ct. 32L __________________________________________ 5, 26
Frisholm v. Fitzgerald, 53 P. 1109 (Colo.)__________________________________________
43
Gibbons v. Frazier, 68 Utah 182; 249 P. 472-----------------------------------Griffith et al. v. Noonan et al., 133 P. 2d 375 (Wyo.)____________________
Hagerman et al. v. Thompson et al., 235 P. 2d 750 (Wyo.)____________
Hastings & Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357; 10 S. Ct. 112________________

5
27
28
25

Lavagnino v. Uhlig, 26 Utah 1; 71 P. 1046... ------------------------------------MacDonald v. Midland Mining Co., 293 P. 2d 911 (Cal.)____________________

25
36

McEvoy v. Hyman, 25 F. 596 (C. C., D. Colo.)-------------------------------42
37
Muldoon et al. v. Brown et al., 21 Utah 121; 59 P. 720____________________
Norris et al. v. United Mineral Products Co., et al.,
158 P. 2d 679 (Wyo.)------------------------------------------------------------------------27, 42
Pitcher et al. v. Jones et al., 71 Utah 453; 267 P. 184-------------------- 5, 30
36
Stock v. Plunkett, 183 P. 657 (Cal.)---------------------------------------------------41
Sullivan et al. v. Sharp et al., 80 P. 1054 (Colo.)________________________________
Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 85; 32 S. Ct. 187.-------------------------------

14

Statutes
30 USCA 23 (General Mining Laws- 17 Stat. 91)-------------------------5
30 USCA 181 ff. (Mineral Leasing Act- 41 Stat. 437)________________
19
30 USCA 521 (Public Law 585- 68 Stat. 708) ______________________ ..4, 19, 38,39
UCA 1953, 40-1-1 ------------·---------------------------------------·-------------------------------

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Interior Department Decisions
Clear Gravel Enterprises, Inc., A-27287 ................................................_
Clear Gravel Enterprises, Inc., 64 I.D. 210.................................... ~--Greene, R. L., et al., A-27181..................................................................
Jebson et al. v. Spencer et al., 61 I.D. 161............................................
Monolith Portland Cement Co. et al. v. J. R. Gillbergh et al.,
61 I.D. 43 ............................................................................................
Oregon Basin Oil and Gas Co., 50 L.D. 253 ....................-...................
United States v. Arizona Manganese Corp., 57 I.D. 558....................

21
21
21
19
24
15
16

Miscellaneous
AEC Circular 7, 10 CFR 60.7 .................................................................. 4, 39
Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, p. 1026............................................ 13
Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th Ed., p. 633, p. 160........................... .41, 43
27 Rocky Mt. Law Review 404................................................................ 14
28 So. Calif. Law Review 147................................................................ 23
9 Wyo. Law Journal 214.......................................................................... 18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
G. T. RUMMEL, l\L M. HARDIN,
MATHEW P. ROWE and ROY
M. EIDAL, doing business as
LA SALLE MINING COMpANY, a partnership,
Appellants (Plaintiffs)

-vs.K. R. BAILEY, JR., and JOLENE
BAILEY, husband and wife;
E. J. HALL and RUTH HALL,
husband and wife; MILTON C.
NIELSON and ESTELLA NIELSON, husband and wife; F. G.
McFARLAND and S. R. HULLINGER,
Respondents (Defendarnts ).

Case
No. 8622
)

1

Reply Brief of Appellants
Appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court
in and for San Juan County, Utah.

INTRODUCTORY
While Respondents (hereinafter referred to as ''defendants") state that in general they agree with the statement of facts made by Appellants (hereinafter referred
1
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to as "plaintiffs") in their Opening Brief, it will be necessary, in view of certain statements made by defendants, to make reference in this reply brief to certain facts
and testimony as the same were developed at the trial.
The fundamental issues in this case are clearly
drawn. It is the contention of plaintiffs that the trial
court erred in failing to recognize and apply well established law as to what constitutes a valid discovery on a
lode mining claim. Statements by the trial court (R. 94,
853, 932) demonstrate, as do its findings and judgment
in the light of the record, that the trial court felt that the
established law of discovery does not apply to uranium
deposits where the mineralization is frequently, as in this
case, found at depth in unexposed formations and in
respect to which there are no mineralized fissures or
lodes which offer a lead to be followed.
It is not controverted that discovery under such circumstances presents problems and difficulties. It is controverted that the existence of such difficulties affords any
basis for the disregard of the statutory requirement of
discovery. This problem is not fundamentally different
from that which existed-in the·-~;k-i!ig_~Q_f__dG~ov_ecy~~P.
placer petroleum ~i~·i;~-~h-~~~ ~~i_~;-to the--enactment of

-·

-

-·

..

·--·--

the Mineral Leasing Ac~t of February 25, 1920 ( 41 Stat.
437 the ~ining laws__~y_e:re applicable to. theJQ_Q~t~<:m of
claimsf()_:f.~il-~ gas. Oil and gas anticlines were drilled
where there was ~ce existence of structure forming
a reasonable basis for exploratory drilling but the law.

r,
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nonetheless, required discovery and conditions favorable
to exploration were no substitute for discovery.
Exploratory drilling has been performed and is presently, throughout the Colorado Plateau area, being performed on uranium claims where reasonable justification
for the drilling may be found in geological orientation
and in results of exploration outside of and beyond the
mining claim. But
the
necessity
-· it does not follow
.........,.._... .. that
-- of discovery has been
dispensed with.
----··

-

.,...,,~·~•"'""'""'·""'""_

,_~,

.. .--·-

.

.

•

'

----~-------------·--··--4-

An ~ss~~tial_e]~JD.ent of discovery is expectation of
finding a pay or co!!!!!!erQ!!-!1. mineral deposit l:m.t to constitute dis·c~~~;Y__ !._~~m~st_!>~---~--P..Il(}ing within limits
of the claim of mineral or mineral bearing r<:>~~~ ~~-~.fur
ther exploration o:f which
so found mineral deposit
----- - - - - -- would
justify further expenditure
of ......time and money
in
.,;,.._.
. -. .
..
the reasonable expectation that the pursuit and following
of that which-wa8''¥otl"~d would lead '"to' pay--·or.· 'commercial.ore.
-

"

.

.

"

~ -~· .....-

'

In a determination of whether a particular mining
claim or a conflicting mining claim has prior validity, the
time and the place of discovery are vital. He who asserts
discovery should be able to say what he found, where he
found it and when he found it. In the case at bar, defendants say that they observed a sandstone lens in the
area - a sandstone lens which evidences no more mineralization than the soil in the yard at the courthouse where
this case was tried. Defendants did nothing to explore
that ''sandstone lens.'' No one anywhere in the vicinity
3
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had done so. It had no value. It led to nothing. It meant
nothing other than as it may have meant to someone familiar with geology that the ore productive Shinarump
formation was some hundreds of feet below.
Defendants were required to show that they made a
valid discovery on their respective mining claims prior
to July 24, 1953. They failed to do so. The finding by
the trial court that plaintiffs' locations were wholly
invalid because they bore a date in advance of their
actual posting, wholly disregards the facts that:
An Amended ~ otice of Location, dated October 1, 1953, was, on that date, posted by plaintiffs
on their Red Canyon X o. 6 claim;
An Amended Notice of Location, dated October 3, 1953, was, on that date, posted by plaintiffs
on their Red Canyon No. 9 claim;
Notices of Lease Application, dated May 21,
1954, were on said date posted on plaintiffs' claims
pursuant to the provisions of .AEC Circular 7 (10
CFR 60.7) with respect to which a timely filing of
a Lease Application with AEC was made by plaintiffs on June 25, 1954; and
On September 1, 1954, plaintiffs posted on
each of their claims an Amended Notice of Location ''for the purpose of correcting any errors in
the original location, description or record, or validity • * •, and for the purpose of obtaining the
benefits" of Public Law 585 ( 68 Stat. 708; 30
USCA 501).
Reply will be made to defendants' points in the order
in which they are discussed in Respondents' Brief.

4
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I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT A VALID DISCOVERY HAD BEEN
MADE ON DEFENDANTS' MAYBE NOS.
1, 2, 3, 4 AND RED FRY NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4
CLAIMS OR ON ANY OF THEM PRIOR
TO JULY 24, 1953.
This error by the trial court is discussed in part in
Appellants' Opening Brief (pp. 33-39). The federal mining law expressly declares:

'' * * * no location of a mining claim shall be made
until the discovery of the vein or lode within the
limits of the claim located." ( 30 USCA 23)
Identical language is found in the Utah statutes (UCA
1953, 40-1-1).
In recognition of these statutes, this Court in
Pitcher v. Jones, 71 Utah 453, 457; 267 P. 184, said:
''It, of course, is well settled that it is essential to the validity of a mining location, or lode
claim, that there be a discovery of mineral in place
within the limits of the claim."
To the same effect is Gibbons v. Frazier, 68 Utah 182,
184; 249 P. 472.
In Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286; 40 S. Ct. 321, 326, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
''In practice discovery usually precedes location, and the statute treats it as the initial act.
But in the absence of an intervening right it is no
objection that the usual and statutory order is re5
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versed. In such a case the location becomes effeetive from the date of discovery; but in the presence
of an intervening right it must remain of no
effect.''
Against the background of the foregoing short statement of the pertinent and applicable statutes and decisions, we shall undertake to analyze the facts which the
defendants rely upon as constituting a compliance with
the law requiring the discovery of mineral in place within
the geographical limits of each of their claims prior to
July 24, 1953, the date the oil and gas application was
filed. This date is controlling as we have established in
our Opening Brief and as we shall further demonstrate in
this brief. July 24, 1953, is the date before which any
discovery must have been made to be of avail to
defendants.
Defendants rely in the main upon the testimony of
defendant Milton C. Nielson. At page 7 of Respondents'
Brief, they say that this defendant had been familiar
with the area and that prior to 1953 he had observed the
channelling and mineralization in the area of Red and Fry
Canyons. The record (page 522) shows he had prospected
the area prior to 1953. His observations at that time must
not have impressed him for he did not then stake any
claims in the area although he was there for the purpose
of prospecting (R. 523, line 2). At page 7 of their brief,
defendants apparently seek to show that, at the time of
staking the claims involved in this action, defendant Nielson was on defendants' claims with a geiger counter. However, a reading of the reeord at lines 10 to 30, page 524,

6
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shows that defendant Nielson did not know when he was
in the conflict area with a geiger counter.
This defendant said he saw "a little bit of mineralization, black copper, I call it." (R. 524) While not so
stated in Respondents' Brief, the witness was testifying
to an observation which he claimed to have made prior
to 1953 (see lines 20-30, R. 523). In addition to the foregoing, defendant Nielson testified that he saw a ''sandstone lens.'' At page 9 of Respondents' Brief, the statement is made (supposedly supported by a reference to
page 535 of the record) that defendant Nielson staked
additional claims ''based upon the mineralization and the
copper showing on the contact of the Moenkopi and
Shinarump.'' This statement that the claims were
located "based upon the mineralization and copper
showing" is a conclusion of the writers of Respondents'
Brief and is a statement not found in or in any way supported by the record at page· 535 thereof or elsewhere.
It is interesting to note that defendant Nielson
asserts that he staked part of the claims on one day and
that, on the next day, he returned and staked more claims.
This defendant signed a payroll record certifying that
he had worked full time for a construction company
(R. 551-553) on each of said two days.
We submit that the foregoing is the only testimony
relating to discovery given by defendant Nielson who
located defendants' claims. He did not say and could not
say where on any or even on what claims he saw the
asserted mineralization or a sandstone lens. At the tak-

7
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ing of the deposition of this defendant, he freely and
unequivocally stated under oath that he had made no discovery of Gre on any of the claims of defendants involved
in this litigation (Nielson deposition, p. 15, lines 6-8).
At pages 10 and 11 of their brief, defendants state
that defendant Nielson in fact made a discovery on Maybe
No.2 and on Maybe No.3. For this conclusion defendants
cite pages 560 and 561 of the record. An impartial reading of the record discloses that, when asked at his deposition if he made any discovery of ore on any of these
claims, defendant Nielson answered in the negative. By
trial time, however, he had been educated to the necessity
of having made a discovery. Then for the first time and
after having to admit that he had stated that he had
made no discovery on any of defendants' claims, Nielson
came up with the convenient excuse that what he had
meant was that he had made a discovery a.t some indeterminate but earlier date. That, we submit, is an escape
effort which is either, on the one hand, unworthy of belief
or is, on the other, so vague that it is of no probative
value. Had this man honestly considered that he had
made a discovery at any time he would have so stated in
his deposition.
Defendant E. J. Hall is referred to on page 12 of
Respondents' Brief as having observed mineralization on
Red Fry No. 3 and ~fay be Nos. 3 and 4. The record must
again be read for a correct and factual understanding
(R. 445). What defendant Hall testified as having seen
was "stains and what it looked like to me as mineralized

8
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--

sandstone.'' These
were not leads .i<L 3.Jlything and de.,.._...., ...----.-___._..--- ..
fendants did not follow them. Hall did not say on what
parr of any particular claim or even on what claim or
claims he made any such observation.
Defendant Bailey is also quoted in the brief as stating that he examined the sandstone rim with a scintillator
and got a count (R. 604-605). He did not say what the
count was. He did not say on what part of any particular
claim he got a count or even what claim or claims he was
on. His testimony also must be read in the light of his
deposition, at the time of the taking of which he could not
even state at wliat time in 1953 he had been in the area.
The foregoing is all the evidence as to defendants'
alleged discovery prior to July 24, 1953. The balance of
defendants' testimony on discovery is that of parties
who were employed by them to examine the property in
connection with defendants' preparation for the trial of
this suit and, of course, has no bearing on the factual
situation as the same existed prior to July 24, 1953.
Defendants urge upon this Court the adoption of
what defendants refer to as a "liberal" interpretation of
the law, i. e., a liberal interpretation of the mining
statutes of the United States and of the State of Utah
cited above. Plaintiffs submit that defendants are in
fact urging disr~.g_~.;rd __of._the_ . r.equir.eme.nt..-::of -~discovery
~•''"_,.,......,,_.,...._.

•

·-·~·-·--•••-•~·w·•·•

wni:~isth~-;~ry ~~~~~~!-~?~ ..?.!.. .!~~--~~~~~[Jaws.

Defendants did nothing but observe a sandstone lens in the general vicinity of the claims and saw (where is not shown)
9
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what they considered to be mineralization and black
copper.
It must be borne in mind that the surfaces of the
area looked at by defendants Bailey, Hall and Nielson
were not in the ore horizons of the Shinarump whence
all of the ore production in the area has come. Such surfaces were on top of the barren Mossback (a member of
the upper Chinle formation) whence no production has
ever come.
The basis of defendants' argument for a "liberal"
theory of the law is that a locator may, by the observation of geology and by geological orientation (as distinguished from the finding of ore in place) be led to locate
a claim and, therefore, that he has made a discovery
before he actually finds mineral in place. The observation of these defendants was of surface geology many
hundreds of feet above the ore horizon. No fissures exist
in the area where the alleged observations were made
which argumentatively could have permitted an interchange of mineralization and a deposition of ore or the
following of a mineralized fissure to ore. ~~~
found nothing and followed nothi~g_ ~_!1-J~_!l i!!_~uced the~
to spend either--s-ubsequent time or money in pursuit of
any alTegeciTei<f Rather, they f~Ik;;;d th~-~~-~-~~;~-f the

driTH~g instituted
by .the.ANC..ancLno .drill .holes...:which
·showed ore were comple_t.e.d _on any of the. claims in ques-....;:::_._ ··-

-----·

--· .....

tion~~!i_l___~ft~r A ~g~st 17, 1953. (Testimony of Hyrum
B. Woods, AEC geologist in charge of drilling, as set
forth on pages 169 to 214 of the record.)
10
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The testimony shows that nowhere
in the
vicinity of
. ···--·····- . . .
the claims in question h~~ __?re, commercial or non-commerCi!il, been found i11 t_ll~ Mossback or in the so-called
''sandstone lens'' {U:Ht.that prospecting in those horizons
offered no prospect of success. Of course, defendants
did not start or pursue any work on these horizons - no
reasonable person would have.
~

The fact that these defendants did not see nor find
anything which they could have followed or did follow
to a finding of ore destroys their argument, for even as
to the minority "liberal viewpoint" the "touchstone" of
the "broad interpretation" is that the claimant has found
what" he could follow, expecting to find ore" (Resp. Br.
22). A valid discovery cannot be Q~sed U:QQ_~_g~_Q_logical

inf erence-~~_!~_R~-~~~~~:-~i~~:i~~?~-~! depth of_-~- _p()!en tial
ore horizon which has no connection whatever with what
wa.s-rOuild other t?~I~~rin nature's masonry it was laid
d~wn geologic__~g-~_s_ before the surface, ....and___ barren,
Mossback.

W. D. McDougald, an independent geologist, of
Moab, Utah, a graduate of the University of Utah with
Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in
geology, testified he examined the area in question on
three occasions - once with Ken Millard and H. G.
Brown, once with Frank H. MacPherson and once with
Dr. Leland W. Stokes. Samples were taken from the
exposed material at the same points from which defendants caused samples to be take~,,. (R. 890). We must assume that defendants selected for sampling the points

11
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they considered most likely to show mineralization. These
samples were subjected to chemical assay and no copper
was found. There being no copper there for defendant
Nielson to have observed, he could not possibly have seen
any copper, either black or any other color, at these points
which defendants, not plaintiffs, selected for sampling.
Moreover, the chemical assays of the eleven samples so
taken range between 0.002 and 0.013 of one percent U 30 8 ,
less than the geiger counter indicated in the court house
lawn.
Frank H. MacPherson, a graduate and experienced
engineer (R. 921-3), t~stified (R. 932-5) that a_prudent
miner~udd not spe~d money 4~i~g--~~lQ!1!.tiQ!t_Work
with the hope of~-~veloping an ~re body on the_ ba~~s of
whatw~;;n in the formation from which these

samj)fes- were. .

taken·.~·

....

--

~~~-·~~·--··~-~--------·

--~.--·.

Dr. Leland W. Stokes, head of the Department of
Geology of the University of Utah and an outstanding
expert, particularly in the field of uranium, testified that
in his examination of the conflict area he found no visible
uranium or signs or uranium mineralization and that no
reas<!_:r:_~~}~--~in~.r or prudenLman would ha~e..spent any
time or money in pursuing ..~~Y.~_:QQ:wing in th~--~-~d-~t()ne
-·------· ·lens above the Ivfossback (R. 943, 945). His statement is
completely consistent with what defendants • actually did,
for they did nothing in respect to pursuing anything they
found in the Mossback. He stated that there was no mineralization relationship between the Mossback and the
Shinarump formation. He further testified that there is

-

12
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about 300 feet of very dense rock of varying kinds between the Mossback surface and the Shinarump in which
the ore body was found by the AEC in its drilling (R.
946). Dr. Stokes testified that there was no possibility of
the lower ore body influencing or being responsible for a
higher ore body- that the Mossback is part of the Chinle
formation and that he knew of no prodUC'tion from the
Chinle formation in the White Canyon area. In reference
to the channelling of which defendants speak, Dr. Stokes
described the nature of channels or ancient stream beds
and -stated that th~---~h~~~ei-i~--th·~~ Mo~~~b;~k-·t~;,~~·rsed
. ·------- -···-··----- -the area
later._geoio.gic. age, !'-.8.:!l._.~_La different Jtngle
andlla<rn.e>r-efatio'ii~-!ifp-.t~--- and wa~. ~influ~ 11 ced by the
or;-p~;d~~t-i;·~-·--~h~nnel i!l. the deep~lying and earlier
----------..
-Shinarump
formation
.
......._____ .---·-···

fn._a

"----··------.----

__

The conclusion of the writers of defendants' brief
(Resp. Br. 19) that Dr. Stokes testified or expressed the
opinion that the Mi Vida property was not worth locating
finds no support in the record.
Th~~.sibility._of

making a discovery may justify exploration in search of a discovery is no more a substitufe.t"or discove.ryo·n·a uraniuiii-cfaim than 18 the existence-- of a f~~~·~~bi~ ~ntieli~~' ·~ll-i~h---;arra~t~··-·d~illing,
· -.......

'"""'",_-_.

•

••••

•

•

•··-•••••••••"" ~-• -••·r~•••• •·••• ••

equivalent to an oil discovery.

Lindley, in his work On Mines, 3rd Ed., Volume 2,
section 437, p. 1026, makes the following statement:
''Of course, exploitation on adjacent lands
might raise a strong presumption that a given
tract contained petroleum. An oil-producing well
13
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within each of four sections of land surrounding
a fifth would produce a conviction that the oil deposit was underneath the fifth section. This fact
might justify the land department in classifying
the section in the category of mineral lands, or the
government surveyor in returning it as such, but
it would not dispense with the necessity of making
a discovery.'' (Citing cases.)
In Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U. S. 85; 32 S. Ct. 187,
188 ( 1912), the court said :
"Discovery without the limits of the claim, no
matter what its proximity, does not suffice."
Six pages of Respondents' Brief (pp. 21-26) represent a quotation from an article appearing in 27 Rocky
Mountain Law Review 404. Such quotation constitutes
that author's discussion of what he refers to as the "liberal view.'' In introducing his discussion, the author
states ( p. 408) :
"Two main lines of authority stand out in the
body of decisions relating to determination of discovery. They diverge with regard to whether
indications of mineral can suffice for a discoYery
in lieu of the actual presence of mineral.''
In the paragraph which follows the foregoing quotation
and precedes that with which defendants' quotation commences (p. 408), ·the author with complete frankness
states:
''The preponderance of decisions hold that
mere indications of mineral, however strong, cannot take the place of discovery of mineral itself.''
(Citing 16 cases of which 4 are decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.)

14
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Following the discussion quoted by defendants, the
author of the article again frankly states:
''As stated before, however, numerical weight
of authority seems to hold that actual mineral in
place must be revealed, and whether such revelation may be by means other than the sense of sight
is not clear.'' ( p. 413)
Reference to the authorities cited for the so-called
"liberal view" will indicate that such weight of authority does not depend upon numbers alone. Not a single
decision by the United States Supreme Court is cited for
the "liberal view." Two pages of the quotation (Resp.
Br. 24-26) represent discussions of or quotations from
two decisions by the Director of the Bureau of Land
Management.
Let us refer to two decisions by the Secretary of
the Interior Department, who, on appeal, reviews decisions by the Director of the Bureau of Land
l\1anagement.
In the case of Oregon Basin Oil and Gas Co., 50 L.D.
253 (1924), it is stated:
"The Department is aware of n2_ decision
wherein, citing the rule announced in Castle v.·
Womble, it has ever taken into consideration the
proyen' pres~-~.c-~.-~it~i!l JP:~. limits or.~~ ·~ng
claim. of deposits not actually and pgysic::tllY ·_expo~ed·therein as a groUild for sustaining_fh~ _sufficieiicy oi'in'· asserted discovery based UP()!l the
expo-sure-within the limits of the_ c~~im of !t. <Jeposit
tharciTd no't 'warrant or justify the expenditure of
time and money _'\Vi.tli a·reaso-riabie prospect of
15
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succ~the _<}~y~J_()_p!!l~J;!t -~L~-y~J·~~ble mine on
the particular deposit so exposed. * * * (255)

''If any doubt ever existed as to the meaning
of the Castle v. Womble rule, that doubt was removed by the decision in Jefferson-Montana Copper Mines Company which specifically points out
that the particular deposit actually discovered
within the limits of a mining claim is the one for
the reasonable prospect of the development of
which into a valuable mine the further expenditure
of time and money must be shown to have been
warranted by the evidence." (256)
In United States v. ArizoM Manganese Corp., 57
I.D. 558 (1942), it is stated:
''The geologists who have been in charge of
the development work and the mineral expert for
the Government agree in the belief that the manganiferous beds underlie all of the claims in question. The reason for this belief, as expressed by
the defendants' witnesses, appears to be that the
various drill holes and outcrops in which manganese is found, considering their position with relation to each other and the claims in question, the
similarity in the formation in which the manganese is found, the occurrence of the mineral in the
same geologic horizons and other geologic eYidence, strongly indicate the continuity and lateral
extent of the deposit and the probability, as to
most of the claims and the possibility as to a few,
that all the claims in question are underlain by the
beds of maganiferous deposits that haYe actually
been discovered. • • •
"It was contended in the appeal to the Commissioner, and is contended here, in effect, that
the geological proof is so strong as to the existence
of manganiferous beds under the claims in ques-
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tion that it would be a waste of money to require
discovery by drilling on each contested claim; that
manganese is a strategic mineral and the Bureau
of Mines and the Geological Survey are interested
in developing a large and adequate domestic reserve of such mineral to provide for national defense needs in the present emergency; that large
expenditures necessary to establish a plant to develop the property are not justified unless title is
obtained to the entire compact and contiguous
area and therefore the technical rule of actual discovery on the claim should be waived by the Department as it did in the Rough Rider case ( 42
L.D. 584) when there was no national emergency
or other compelling reason.
''The Commissioner held that:
A discovery of mineral is an essential of
the first importance ; regardless of any emergency that may exist it is a requirement that
this office has no authority to waive. Section
2320 R. S. (30 U.S. C. 23), provides that 'no
location of a mining claim shall be made until
the discovery of the vein or lode within the
limits of the claims located.'
''The rule that no lode mining claim can be
located and no patent issued until the actual discovery of a vein or lode within the limits of the
claim as located and that mere indications or
belief in the existence of mineral on the claim do
not amount to a discovery, is well settled. See 30
U.S.C.A. sec. 23, note 124, and cases cited in Rough
Rider and Other Lode Claims, 41 L.D. 242, 253,
254; East Tintic Consolidated Mining Co., 41 L.D.
255; Oregon Basin Oil and Gas Comp01ny, 50 L.D.
244 ; id. 258 ; Lindley on Mines, (3d ed.) sec. 437.
Also a discovery outside the location no matter
what its proximity to the lines of the claim is not
17
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a discovery thereon. Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U.S.
85, 91. The case of Rough Rider and Other Lode
Claims ( 42 L.D. 584), has plainly no application
to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the case is
no longer followed. Gonzales v. Stewart, 46 L.D.
85. If it can be shown that the prompt acquisition
of title to these claims by the claimants, without
compliance with the law as to discovery, would
expedite the accumulation of manganese resources
for the purpose of national defense, that showing
might constitute an appropriate basis for congressional legislation. The Department is without authority to disregard the law for such reasons. The
Commissioner was right in holding invalid the
claims upon which no actual and physical exposure
of manganese has been made.'' ( 559-560)
Defendants use two pages of their brief (Resp. Br.
26-28) to quote from a law student Xote appearing in
9 Wyoming La;w Journal 214. In the quotation used by
defendants, the author refers to geological information
and to radio-activity readings. It may be pointed out that
in the article the author also said:
''An informed guess based on geological e·ddence indicating the likelihood of discovery is not
sufficient in the absence of a.n actual discovery of
minerals within the confines of the claim.'' ( p. 215)
In respect to radiometric readings, the author says:
"However, consideration must be giYen to the
fact that elements other than uranium are radioactive. In addition, these instruments are subject
to failure due to defectiYe batteries, malfunction
of the mechanism due to rough or improper handling in the field and subjection of the instrument
to extreme humidity or cold. • • • HoweYer, in
view of the uncertainties described above it is be18
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lieved that additional evidence would be required
to establish a valid discovery." (p. 218)
It may also be pointed out that in the same paragraph
and in the sentence which precedes the quotation
used by
1'"\
defendants commencing on the last paragraph of page 27
of defendants' brief, the author whom they quote stated:
''Information which is of a general nature is
not sufficient to support a claim of discovery.
Thus, the testimony of four witnesses that a discovery complied with the meaning of the standard
was ineffective and failed to establish that a valid
discovery had been made.'' ( p. 216)
Defendants (Resp. Br. 33-38), with no supporting
authorities whatsoever, dispute the proposition that
prior to enactment on August 13, 1954, of Public Law
585 ( 68 Stat. 708; 30 USCA 521), a valid mining claim
could not be located on land embraced within an issued
oil and gas lease or embraced within a pending application for an oil and gas lease under the Mineral Leasing
Act of February 25, 1920 ( 41 Stat. 437; 30 USCA
181 ff.).
We quote from the decision of the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior in J ebson et al. v. Spencer
et al., 61 I. D. 161, 163-164).

''The first question for consideration is
whether the land was subject to mining location on
February 2, 1940, when the discovery of minerals
is claimed to have been made by the contestants.
(Emphasis supplied)
''Prior to the passage of the leasing acts, including the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25,
19
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1920, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States were open to exploration
and purchase, and the lands in which they were
found were open to occupation and purchase under
the provisions of the mining laws (30 U.S.C., 1946
ed., sec. 21 et seq.). The leasing acts inaugurated
an entirely new system with respect to the disposition of lands containing the deposits dealt with
in those acts. The Mineral Leasing Act provided
that, with the exception of valid claims existing on
February 25, 1920, deposits of oil and gas and
lands containing such deposits should be subject
to disposition only in the form and manner provided therein (30 U. S. C., 1946 ed., sees. 181 and
193).
''Shortly after the passage of the Mineral
Leasing Act, the Department held that there could
be no room for the contemporaneous operation of
the mining laws and the Mineral Leasing Act with
respect to the same lands ; and that if an attempt
were made, after the enactment of the Mineral
Leasing Act, to locate a mining claim on land covered by an outstanding permit or lease issued
under the act or known at the time of the attempted location to be valuable for any of the minerals
mentioned in the :Mineral Leasing Art, the Department would not recognize the attempted location. See Joseph E. McClory ef al., 50 L. D. 623
(1924); letter dated October 9, 1924, from Secretary Work to Congressman Richards, 50 L. D.
650 (1924). The Department has maintained its
position in this respect over the years. See United
States v. United States Borax Company, 58 I.D.
426, 432 (1943). The Department has also held
that the filing of an allowable application for an
oil and gas prospecting permit or for a noncompetitive oil and gas lease has a segregative effect
on the land applied for and confers upon the applicant a priority of right over any adverse interest
20
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thereafter sought to be initiated. Filtrol Company
v. Brittarn a;nd Echart, 51 L.D. 649 (1926); Monolith Portland Cement Company et al., 61 I.D. 43
(1952).
The Interior Department decisions in R. L. Greene
et al., A-27181 (1955), Clear Gravel Enterprises, Inc.,
A-27287 (1956) and Clear Gravel Enterprises, Inc., 64
I. D. 210 ( 1957), are to the same effect.
The R. L. Greene et al. case involved two mining
claims, one of which covered lands which at the time of
the location were included within a pending application
for an oil and gas lease which was subsequently issued.
The other mining claim covered lands which at the time
of location were included in an outstanding oil and gas
lease. After stating the rule of J ebson et al. v. Spencer
et al., above referred to, the Solicitor, in his decision of
May 11, 1955, stated:
''Thus, in the present case, the two claims
were located at a time when the land embraced in
the claims was not open to mineral location. The
claims therefore have no validity.
''While these holdings of the Department
have apparently never been considered by the
courts, the position taken by the Department has,
in effect, been affirmed by two recent acts of
Congress.
"By the act of August 12, 1953 [Public Law
250] (30 U.S. C., 1952 ed., Supp. I, sees. 501-505 ),
Congress provided, among other things, that any
mining claim located under the mining laws of the
United States subsequent to July 31, 1939, and
prior to January 1, 1953, on lands of the United
21
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States which were at the time of such location included in a lease issued under the Mineral Leasing
Act or covered by an application for such a lease
should be effective to the same extent as if such
mining claim had been located on lands which
were at the time of such location subject to location under the mining laws of the United States.
The act required, however, that in order to obtain
the benefits of the act the owner of any such mining claim must, not later than 120 days after
August 12, 1953, post on such claim and file for
record in the office where the notice of location
of such claim was of record an amended notice of
location of such claim, stating that such notice
was filed pursuant to the provisions of the act and
for the purpose of obtaining the benefits thereof.
The act provided further that any mining claim
given force and effect under the act shall be subject to the reservation to the United States of all
minerals subject to disposition under the Mineral
Leasing Act.
"A year later, on August 13, 1954, Congress
passed another act [Public Law 585] ( 68 Stat.
708) under the terms of which mining claims may,
thereafter, be loc.ated on lands of the United
States which are at the time of location included
in leases issued under the Mineral Leasing Act
or co\·ered by applic-ations for leases under that
act. The act of August 13, 1954, further repeated
the substance of the ad of ~\ugust 12, 1953, and
provided that in order to be entitled to the benefits thereof the owners of mining claims located
on such lands subsequent to July 31, 1939, and
prior to January 1, 1953, must haYe posted on
the claims and filed for record within the time
allowed by the act of August 12, 1953, amended
no1 i<'t>s of location, stating that such notices were
filed pursuant to the provisions of the 1953 act
22
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and for the purpose of obtaining the benefits
thereof.''
The Law Review article (28 So. Calif. Law Review
147) referred to by defendants (Resp. Br. 34) not only
does not dispute this proposition, it supports it. The
author states (p. 148) :
"Since rights under a valid mining location
were rights of present and exclusive possession
which could ripen into full title and since the General Mining Laws did not contemplate anything
less, a valid mining claim and a valid prospecting
permit or lease could not exist at the same time
on the same land.''
The statement quoted from this article by defendants (Resp. Br. 34-35) had absolutely no reference to
the effect of an application for an oil and gas lease or an
issued oil and gas lease as precluding a mining location. It had reference only to the completely independent question of whether or not a mining location could
be made on lands "known to be valuable for leasing act
minerals'' in respect fo which lands there was no pending application or outstanding permit or lease.
Defendants' assertion that a pending application
or issued oil and gas lease did not preclude the making
of a valid mining location, prior to the enactment of
Public Law 585, is not only unsubstantiated but cannot
be substantiated by any citation of authority.
Clearly unsubstantiated and contrary to authority
is defendants' correlative assertion (Resp. Br. 35) that:
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'' • • • the mere filing of an application should
give no right to the applicant other than priority
between oil and gas lease claimants.''
This assertion like its companion argument above discussed is contrary to consistent rulings of the Interior
Department.
In the case of Monolith PortlO!ild Cement Company
et al. v. J. R. Gillbergh et al., 61 I. D. 43, 48-49 (1952), it
is stated:
"Moreover, it is clear that rights under the
mining laws cannot be acquired in a tract of public
land after the filing and during the pendency of a
proper application for a noncompetitive oil and
gas lease on such land. Although' the mere filing
of a proper application for a noncompetitive oil
and gas lease on a tract of public land does not
obtain for the applic-ant a -vested right to a lease,
the person first submitting a proper application
does acquire an inceptive or inchoate right to be
offered a lease on the land before a lease is offered
to a subsequent applicant, if it is decided by the
Secretary of the Interior (or his delegate), in the
exercise of his discretion, that the land will be
made available for oil and gas development, if it
is decided that the land is not within any known
geological structure of a producing oil or gas field,
and if it is decided that the applicant is qualified to
obtain and hold a lease on the land. (See Warwick
llf. Downing, A-25798, .A.ugust 16, 1950, 60 I.D. 433:
Bettie H. Rtid ef ano., A-26330, February 4, 1952,
61 I.D. 1.) The inceptiYe rights of the senior a.pplirant for a noncompetitiYe oil and gas lease on a
particular tract of public land tnust be protected
pending a determination as to whether the land
wilJ be made available f~r oil and gas develop24
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ment, as to whether the land applied for is within
the known geological structure of a producing oil
or gas field, and as to whether the applicant is
qualified to hold the lease for which he has applied.
For this reason, rights cannot be acquired under
the mining laws in land that is covered by a pending proper application for a noncompetitive oil
and gas lease, since such rights would be incompatible with the rights of an oil and gas lessee if
the applicant's inchoate or inceptive right should
ripen into an oil and gas lease."
As to Interior Department decisions the Supreme
Court of the United States in Hastings & Co. v. Whitney,
132 U. S. 357, 366; 10 S. Ct. 112 (1889), said:
"It is true that the decisions of the Land Department on matters of law are not binding upon
this court, in any sense. But on questions similar
to the one involved in this case they are entitled
to great respect at the hands of any court. In
United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763, this
court said: 'The construction given to a statute
by those charged with the duty of executing it is
always entitled to the most respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent
reasons.''
The Supreme Court of Utah likewise so held in Lavag:..
nino v. Uhlig, 26 Utah 1, 71 P. 1046, 1049 (1903).
Defendants' argument demonstrates that they
wholly fail to realize that it was not any misconception
that an oil and gas lease included rights as to minerals
other than oil and gas which rendered wholly incompatible the coexistence of rights under the Mineral Leasing
Act and rights under the General Mining Laws; it was,
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rather, the fact that a valid mining claim carried rights
as to all minerals including oil and gas which precluded
such coexistence. Public Law 585, enacted August 13,
1954, met this situation by prescribing that mining locations did not carry rights as to leasing act minerals. It
also provided a method by which mining claims, which
lacked validity because they embraced lands within an
application for or issued permit or lease under the Mineral Leasing Act, could be validated. Plaintiffs did what
was necessary to obtain this validating benefit. Defendants did not.
Defendants state (Resp. Br. 36-37) that a discovery
after location relates back to the date of the location and
validates the claim ''if there have been no intervening
rights.''
The United States Supreme Court does not agree
with that assertion.
''In practice, discovery usually precedes location, and the statute treats it as the initial act
but in the absence of an intervening right it is no
objection that the usual and statutory order is reversed. In such a case the location becomes
effective from the date of discovery;· but in the
presence of an intervening right it must remain of
no effect. (Citing authorities) '' Cole Y. Ralph, 252
U. S. 286, 296; 40 S. Ct. 321, 326 (1920).
Defendants blandly state that the rights of an applicant
for nn oil and gas lease and a lessee under an oil and gas
lease do not constitute intervening rights. How complete
is the error of this unfounded and unsupported assertion
26
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appears not only from the above referred to Interior Department decisions but also from the following court
cases.
In Griffith et al. v. Noonan et al., 133 P. 2d 375, 376
(1943), the Supreme Court of Wyoming said:
''Counsel for appellants have cited us to various decisions of the United States Land Department, for instance, Joseph E. McClory, 50 L.D.
623, where it was held that the granting of an oil
and gas prospecting permit precludes, as long as
the permit is in force, the appropriation of the
land for metalliferous minerals under the United
States mining laws. That, too, was held in Filtrol
Company v. Brittan &; Eckart, 51 L. D. 649. The
correctness of these decisions may be conceded,
but the question herein is as to whether or not the
oil and gas prospecting permit above mentioned
was in force on May 17, 1939. ''
The court held, as had the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, that the permit in question had ''expired by
operation of law on December 31, 1938. ''
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Wyoming court said in Norris et al. v. United Mineral Products Co. et al., 158 P. 2d 679, 683 (1945):
''Trial of the cause was to the Court without
a jury and a judgment was entered which may be
briefly summarized as follows : The Court found
that due to the fact that the Blakeman Oil and
Gas Permit, mentioned above as applied for August 31, 1934, allowed April 9, 1936, and cancelled
September 9, 1939, was outstanding upon the lands
in controversy during that period and conse27
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quently these lands 'were not subject to location or
, entry under the mining laws of the United
States'; • * *"
In Hagerma;n et al. v. Thompson et al., 235 P. 2d 750,
753 (Wyo. 1951), it is stated:
"At that time, however, these lands were included in an oil and gas prospector's permit held
by one Walter F. Tracy, so it is admitted herein
that the location made at that time was void. Griffithv. Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395,133 P. 2d 375."
Numerous types of withdrawals and reservations
preclude Jhining locations. Numerous types of entries under public land laws preclude mining locations. Prior to
Public Law 585, an application for or issuance of a permit
or lease under the Mineral Leasing Act precluded mining
locations. Defendants complain (Resp. Br. 38):
"If the Plaintiffs can prevail on their theory"
(that a valid mining claim cannot be located on
land closed to location by reason of the filing of an
application for or issuance of a permit or lease
under the Mineral Leasing Act) ''a locator of
mining claims would have to make frequent current checks in the District Land Office of the
Bureau of Land :Management to determine
whether there was an oil and gas lease application
covering this particular land. If an application .
. had been filed on the land, they would then have
to make a daily check to determine whether the oilgas application had been accepted and then
attempt to determine what else need be done to
hold his claim.''
The same could be said with respect to withdrawals or
reRcrYations or reYocations or modifications of with28
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drawal or reservation orders or of other entries. There is
nothing new in the proposition that~ valid mining claim
may not be made on public lands which are not open to
location. The fact is and has always been that the status
of the body of public lands in this respect varies from
time to time and from day to day. The United States
District Land Offices have always been the source of
information as to what lands are and what lands are not
subject to location. Any mining locator who does not
care to gamble on the question of whether his mining location is or is not valid must determine that the status of
the lands upon which his claim is situated w~ not such
as to defeat his location.

II
PLAINTIFFS PROVED THE VALIDITY OF
THEIR RED CANYON NO. 6 AND NO. 9
CLAIMS
Not once but three times (Resp. Br. pp. 3, 39, 50)
defendants state that plaintiffs have '' abondoned'' all of
their claims except the Red Canyon Nos. 6 and 9. The
multiplication of this misstatement does not change its
character. Plaintiffs have ''abandoned'' no claim. They
have simply and candidly stated (Appts. Br. p. 2) to the
Court that they proved discovery on only two of their
claims: Red Canyon Nos. 6 and 9. Plaintiffs assert that
defendants have not proved validity of any of defendants'
claims. There is no foundation in the record in this case
for holding valid any of the claims involved (either plaintiffs' or defendants') except plaintiffs' Red Canyon Nos.
29
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6 and 9. The remainder of the area, so far as the record is
concerned, is still subject to the acquisition of rights
under the Mining Laws but no location heretofore or
hereafter made thereon can be valid and effective unless
and until it is supported by discovery.
Defendants assert (Resp. Br. p. 39) that plaintiffs
''failed to show any discovery of ore by themselves.''
This contention has unequivocally been answered in
Pitcher et aL v. Jones et al., 71 Utah 453, 267 P. 184, 186,
where this Court held:
''Nor is it essential that the locator of a mining claim should be the first discoverer of a vein
or lode in order to make a valid location, and if it
appears that the locator knew at the time of making his location that there had been a discovery of
a vein or lode within the limits of his location, he
may base his location upon it and thus avoid the
necessity of making a discovery for himself. 18
R. C. L. 1122; 40 C. J. 785.''
Plaintiffs rely upon the discoveries made by the AEC
in its drilling program and upon plaintiffs' acquisition
of knowledge of these discoveries through observation of
the cores brought to the surface and left beside the drill
holes and through recognition of the ore contained in
these cores.
Hyrum B. Wood, an AEC geologist, testified that
drill hole No. 78, which is on the Red Canyon No.6 (Exh.
P -97), was bottomed September 2, 1953. The chemical
analysis of this core showed ore ranging from .06 percent
to .10 percent UsOs (R. 209-210). The AEC drilling pro-

30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gram was in progress when plaintiffs' agents Andrews
and Pasco first went upon the property (R. 247). The
cuttings and cores from the drill holes were examined.
Pasco, who holds a degree in geology from the University
of Utah ( R. 85), testified that he examined cuttings and
cores from drill holes on Red Canyon No. 6 and that
such cuttings and cores showed mineralizaion (R. 110).
Andrews also so testified (R. 253). The AEC had drilled
a total of nine holes on Red Canyon No. 6 (Exh. P-97).
Pasco was not only on plaintiffs' claims at the time the
original locations were made but he was also there
in November of 1953 (R. 117) and subsequently in May,
1954, for the purpose of posting plaintiffs' Circular 7
Notices of Lease Application.
Drill hole No. 109 on the Red Canyon No. 9 was
completed December 31, 1953. Pasco examined the core
from that drill hole in May of 1954. This was an ''ore
hole" -that is, one in which ore with a minimum content of .10 percent U 30s was found. The observed evidences of mineralization of ore in these drill holes from
the Shinarump formation were subsequently verified by
the chemical analyses of the AEC. Discoveries on both
plaintiffs' Red Canyon No. 6 and Red Canyon No. 9
claims are clearly established. That these <li§~Qy.mies
~-------....---·.
were made by the AEC in the course of its drilling in no
way preclUdes' adop#_~I.l g{these --d{s~®:.Ye-nes' b_y_plaintiffs
c:::.__ .
.
·" .
-··
--.
and, as· s~~-~ }I,e:re.~nabove, this Court in the Pitcher
casein-terms so held.
~-,-~·-

Defendants assert that plaintiffs had not spent any
money exploring the claims located by them. This liti-
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gation was commenced May 22, 1955. Plaintiffs performed over $1,100.00 worth of core drilling and bulldozer work as assessment work during the assessment
year ended July 1, 1955 ( Exh. P -36, pp. 43-44, R. 354-7).
Under a stipulation (R. 43-53) approved by the trial
court May 11, 1956, it was agreed that defendants' operators, Mc-Farland and Hullinger, might proceed in accordance with the lease of February 19, 1954; that the lessors'
royalty would be impounded pending outcome of this litigation; that work done by McFarland and Hullinger on
the property should satisfy the applicable assessment
work requirements as to plaintiffs' claims and as to defendants' claims ; and that any development or discovery
work thenceforth done by them would accrue to the benefit of the party prevailing in this litigation.
Incidentally, the only monies the defendant locators
ever spent in exploration upon their claims, either above
or below the ground, were the fees they paid to Davis
and others in seeking, shortly before the trial, to establish
that the "sandstone lens" was a "discovery." After the
AEC had made discoveries on the Red Canyon X os. 6 and
9 (discoveries which cannot give validity to defendants'
claims- this not because the AEC made them but for
reasons elsewhere in this and in Appellants' Opening
Brief set out), the defendant operators, McFarland and
TTullinger, drifted into the channel which the AEC drilling had disclosed. This they did with knowledge of plaintiffs' claims, and prior to the above-mentioned stipulation,
in gambling disregard of plaintiffs' claims.
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Neither the defendant locators nor the defendant operators ever evidenced the slightest interest in the ''sandstone lens'' other than as they sought to claim it as a
blanket discovery in an attempt to breathe life into defendants' invalid locations.
Defendants attempt to make much of an unsupported
assertion (Resp. Br. 40-41) that plaintiffs moved or
''floated'' the plaintiffs' Red Canyon No. 9 claim. Plaintiffs did no such thing. There was an error in the description in the recorded original Notice of Location of this
claim. The law is clearly established to the effect that
where there is a discrepancy between the description
written into the Notice and the actual monuments on the
ground, the latter prevail. Moreover, an amended Notice
of Location was posted on said claim on October 3, 1953,
sixteen days after the recording of the original Notice
on September 17, 1953. In this Amended Notice, which
was recorded October 26, 1953, the description of the
original Notice was corrected and made more certain.
This is one of the clearly recognized purposes of amendment. Even had the position of the claim lines been
altered (and this was not the case although the law likewise clearly recognizes this as permissable and proper
through amendment) the only effect would have been
that as to any newly included area, the rights would date
from the amendment.
It matters not in the determination of this case whether plaintiffs' rights date from the original Notice of Location; or from the October 3, 1953 amendment; or from
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the Circular 7 Notice posted May 21, 1954; or from the
amendment of September 25, 1954, made pursuant to
Public Law 585 since there were no intervening rights.
Defendants cannot prevail as to any location of theirs
unless they can establish the validity of that location
prior to July 24, 1953, by proof th~t they had a discovery
on that location prior to July 24, 1953.
The survey and other evidence shows conclusively
that plaintiffs' Nos. 6 and 9 claims (and other claims)
were monumented and marked on the ground in substantial accordance with the October, 1953, amendments, the
May 21, 1953, Circular 7 Notices and the September 7
Notices and the September 25, 1954, amendments. The
situs of plaintiffs' claims is and has been fixed. Reference by defendants to plaintiffs' No. 6 and 9 claims as
''floating'' claims and as lacking fixed location is wholly
unwarranted and absurd.
The present situs of defendants' claims, however,
does appear to be different than where originally staked.
Shortly after plaintiffs' claims were staked, defendant
Hall told plaintiff Rummel that the reason plaintiffs did
not find the monuments of defendants' claims was that
"they were down under the rim" ( R. 407). Although defendant Hall testified (R. 458) that "I don't think I made
quite that statement," it is significant that in November,
1955, Erle F. Bielz gave a signed statement (Exh. P-78)
that when he wa8 in the general area with Bailey and
I-I all on .June 2 and 3, 1953, the claims which they staked
were ''on the Shinarump rim under the heavy white
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rim,'' which would place defendants' claims outside the
conflict area and would explain why the other witnesses
did not find them where they now appear. Later, and
after defendant Hall flew to Colorado to see him, Bielz
wrote a letter (Exh. D-79) to repudiate the statement he
had first made. The fact remains that neither the witness Pasco (R. 114-115) nor the witness Andrews
(R. 237) nor the witness W. G. Mathews, a surveyor working for the AEC (R. 358-361) nor the witness J. W. Smith,
an AEC geologist (R. 872-875) found monuments of defendants' claims in the conflict area although they did
find the monuments of plaintiffs' claims.
Hardly worthy of passing mention is defendants'
suggestion (Resp. Br. 41-42) that plaintiffs' Red Canyon
No. 9 claim is invalid because its discovery monument is
located on defendants' Red Fry No. 1 claim. This suggestion of invalidity is based upon defendants' convenient assumption that this Court will decide in their favor
an ultimate issue, i. e. the validity of the Red Fry No.
1 claim. Moreover, it will be noted how defendants' slide
from mention of the discovery monument in one sentence
to a legal assertion in the next sentence and a following
citation both having reference to actual discovery. Perhaps they merely failed to recognize the distinction.
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III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS INVALID BECAUSE OF FRAUD.
The error of the trial court in holding that plaintiffs could acquire no rights because their originally
posted Notices of Location were dated prior to the posting is discussed in Appellants' Opening Brief, pages 16
through 21.
Defendants' argument in this respect is replete with
misstatements apparently intended to obscure the issues
with prejudice. The dating of plaintiffs' original Notices
of Location ahead of their posting was intended by plaintiffs' agents to protect the claims against the misconduct
of others and not to defraud or injure anyone. Admittedly, this was bad judgment but no fraudulent motiYe
was involved and the trial court so stated at the trial
(lines 5-10, R. 427).
In Stock v. Plunkett, 183 P. 657 (Cal., 1919), the court
held that the claim of the first locator was valid against
the subsequent locator with notice where the first locator's notice was undated though the statute required that
it be dated. That holding is referred to with approval in
lJiacDonald v. Jlidland Jliniug Co., 293 P. 2d 911 (Cal.,
1956). Inherent in an undated notice is a greater fraud
potential than in a misdated notice, yet in Stock Y.
Plunkett the amendment was held to relate back to the
posting of the undated notice as against an intervening
location. In the case at bar, there was no intervening
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location between the misdated notices and the amendments. The holding in Stock v. Plunkett is completely
consistent with the statement of this Court in Muldoon
et al. v. Brown et al., 21 Utah 121, 59 P. 720-721, quoted at
page 19 of Appellants' Opening Brief.

It is clear that the defendants were not defrauded
nor in the slightest degree affected. Defendants repeatedly assert that plaintiffs when they located their claims
knew about defendants' Red Fry Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 claims
and Maybe Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 claims. The Notices of Location
of defendants' said claims all bore date of April 2, 1953,
and were all recorded April 17, 1953. Why, if plaintiffs
were trying to predate defendants' claims, would they
have selected a date more than four months subsequent
to the recording of defendants' claims'
Further illustrative of the misstatements made by
defendants is the following: (Resp. Br. p. 45)
"Another advantage that the Plaintiffs attempted to gain by using this date was the predating of the issuance of the oil and gas lease
which was dated September 1, 1953. ''
There is not a word in the record to indicate that plaintiffs then had the slightest knowledge as to the oil and
gas lease and, furthermore, the oil and gas lease had been
applied for July 24, 1953, and was actually issued August
7, 1953. The suggestion that an August 18, 1953 date
was intended to predate the effect of that application or
lease issuance is nonsense.
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The Utah statutes contemplate that the corners of a
mining claim will be monumented within the time allowed
for recording of the Notice of Location. Defendants concede that they did not mark the corners of their claims
until June, 1953, a month and a half after defendants had
recorded their Notices of Location. Were defendants
seeking some improper advantage by recording the
Notices of Location before the corners of their claims had
been monumented ~
An Amended Notice of Location of plaintiffs' Red
, Canyon No. 6 mining claim dated October 1, 1953, was
posted that day. An Amended Notice of Location of plaintiffs' Red Canyon No. 9 mining claim dated October 3,
1953, was posted that day. Timely recording was had as
to each of these Amended Notices of Location and each of
these Amended Notices of Location was sufficient standing on its own to constitute an original location.
These amended relocations were, as were plaintiffs'
original locations, then invalid because they covered land
embraced within an oil and gas lease. Section 1 of Public
Law 585 (30 USCA 521), enacted August 13, 1954, provided the means by which such invalid locations could be
validated through the filing of amended notices of location within the period allowed by the statute. This plaintiffs did on September 1. 1954. No such Amended Notices
were filed by defendants as to their claims which were
invalid for ]ack of discovery prior to the filing of the
application pursuant to which said oil and gas lease was
issued.
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On February 10,1954, AEC Circular 7 (10 CFR 60.7)
was promulgated through publication in the Federal
Register. That Circular was designed to permit acquisition of uranium lease rights on lands whereon location of
valid mining claims was precluded because of there being
an outstanding lease or permit under the Mineral Leasing Act or a pending application therefor. On May 21,
1954, plaintiffs, in accordance with this Circular, posted
Notices of Lease Application on their respective claim
tracts. This was followed by a timely filing with AEC of
plaintiffs' Lease Application No. O.G. 1021. Under the
provisions of Section 3 of Public Law 585 (30 USCA 523)
the owner of any pending uranium lease application was
granted a preference right for a period of 120 days after
the date of the enactment for the location of mining
claims covering tracts as to which notices of lease application and a lease application had been filed. The amended
relocations made by plaintiffs September 1, 1954, complied in every respect with the requirements necessary to
entitle plaintiffs to the benefits of that Section 3.
Even apart, however, from the question of whether
plaintiffs' claims were validated under Section 1 of Public Law 585 or whether they are preference right locations
under Section 3 of Public Law 585, the provisions of
Section 5 of Public Law 585 ( 30 USCA 525) opened to
mining location as of August 13, 1954, those lands as to
which mining location had theretofore been precluded
because the lands were either:
1. included in a permit or a lease issued under the
mineral leasing laws ; or
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2. covered by an application or offer for a permit
or lease which had been filed under the mineral
leasing laws ; or
3. known to be valuable for minerals subject to
disposition under the mineral leasing laws.
The amended relocations made by plaintiffs September 1,
1954, complied in all respects with the requirements
necessary for the location of a valid mining claim and, if
treated as effective only as of that date, stand as the first
valid mining locations made as to the area in conflict.
Since there were no intervening rights, it matters
not whether by virtue of compliance with Section 1 of
Public Law 585 plaintiffs' rights date from the posting of
their original locations in September, 1953, or from the
posting of their amended relocations in October, 1953, or
whether by virtue of compliance with Section 3 of Public
Law 585 plaintiffs' rights date from their posting of Circular 7 Notices of Lease Application on :May 21, 1954, or
whether plaintiffs' amended relocations of September 1,
1954, be treated as the first effective date of plaintiffs'
rights.
The gist of defendants' argument is that because
plaintiffs made the mistake of predating their original
Notices of Location there was nothing which they could
do whereby the mistake could be eorrected and rights
could be acquired.
Any careful analysis of the cases relating to amendment will show that as between (1) a situation where the
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original but subsequently amended location was wholly
invalid and (2) a situation where the original but subsequently amended location involved a merely technical
irregularity or deficiency, there is this and only this
distinction : Where the original location was wholly
invalid, an amended relocation which meets the requirements of law operates from the date of the amended
relocation and does not relate the thus established rights
back to the date of the original location. On the other
hand, where there was but a technical irregularity or deficiency, the amendment is related back to the original
location as establishing rights as of the date of the
original location.
Defendants boldly assert (Resp. Br. 47 -48) that a
mining location which is void cannot be amended. Each
of the three cases cited by defendants for this contention
was a Colorado case involving two particular and apparently conflicting Colorado statutory provisions, one of
which declared a defective certificate to be void and the
other of which authorized amendment.
In Morrison's Min.ing Rights, 16th Edition, page 633,
the author states in criticism of Sulliva;n et al. v. Sharp
et al., 80 P. 1054 (Colo.), one of the three cases cited by
defendants:
''The op1n1on everywhere has always been
that a relocation perfected the original location if
in any respect defective, or, if void, the incident
which rendered it void being at the time of relocation gone, it operated as an original location. The
case of Strepy v. Stark, 7 Colo. 614, 620, 5 P. 111,
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17 M. R. 28, so decides in terms. The doctrine that
a relocation could not cure a location originally
void is absolutely novel and contrary to all the
cases which have approached the point. -Beals
v. Cone, 27 Colo. 473, 62 P. 948, 83 Am. St. Rep.
473, 20 M.R. 591; Tonopah & 8. L. M. Co. v. Tonopah M. Co., 125 F. 389, 390."
The foregoing statement from Morrison was quoted with
approval in Norris v. United Mineral Products Co., 158 P.
2d 679, 687-8 (Wyo., 1945).
In McEvoy v. Hyman, 25 F. 596 (1885) another of
the three cases cited by defendants, the federal court for
Colorado in effect attempted to read the word ''void'' out
of one section of the Colorado statutes in reference to
amendments where another section of the Colorado statutes indicated that application of the doctrine of relation
to the original notice was intended. The quotation from
that case set out in Respondents' Brief (p. 48) must be
read in connection with the omitted balance of the second
quoted sentence, the sentence which follows and the
full decision. So read, it is clear that the court held only
that the use of the word ''void'' in one section of the
Colorado statutes did not defeat the operation of the doetrine of relation and, therefore, that the amended location
involved in that case did relate back to the original defective location and did defeat any rights under the location which had intervened. There is nothing in the case
which warrants any inf~rence that an amended relocation
may not be effectiYe as of the date of its making, even
. though it will not relate back.
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In Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th Ed. page 160, it
is stated:
"In Moyle v. Bullene, 7 Colo. App. 308, 44 P.
69, the very tenable distinction is made that where
the original location certificate was so 'defective
as to absolutely fail to comply with the statutory
requirements' it was void and the amended record
would not relate back; but if the original paper
was only lacking in technical detail the two should
be construed as of the date of the first, and both
construed together according to the doctrine of relation. But in Frisholm v. Fitzgerald, 25 Colo. 290,
53 P. 1109, where a record contained no reference
at all to a natural object or permanent monument,
and was not only constructively void for noncompliance with the Congressional Act, but was declared void in terms by the Colorado Statute, the
relocation was held to relate back to the original
record and to e.ut out an intervening title.''

Frisholm v. Fitzgerald, referred to in the above quotation, is the third case relied upon by defendants.
It may be mentioned that Morrison's Mining Rights,
16th Ed. (1936) above referred to, was the work of Emilio
D. DeSoto and Arthur R. Morrison, members of the Colorado Bar.
In Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co.,
106 P. 673 (Wyo., 1910), the court discussed the McEvoy
and Frisholm cases above referred to and clearly recognized that the principle that an amendment of an invalid
location is effective from the making of the amendment
whereas an amendment of a merely imperfect location
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relates back to the original location and cuts off intervening rights. This court stated ( p. 679) :
''Therefore, if a proper construction of the
statute, a question which we do not decide, would
require the location notice to be posted at the discovery shaft as distinguished from the point where
the lode was first discovered upon the claim, there
would be the same irregularity in both the Little
Joe and Merry Christmas location, which, if sufficient to invalidate either claim, would invalidate
both, whereupon it would follow that the amended
certificate of location of the original Little Joe
would take effect as recorded before the existence
of the intervening rights, thereby curing the only
defect suggested by this record as to that
location.''
There was no fraud or fraudulent intent which
would render plaintiffs' original locations invalid. But
even were the original Notices held invalid, there is no
basis for the disregard of plaintiffs' October, 1953,
Amended Notices of Location; or plaintiffs' ~lay, 1954,
Notices of. Lease Application; or plaintiffs' September,
1954, Amended Notices of Location.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be, reversed
and this Court should enter a decree as requested in
Appellants' Opening Brief.
Respectfully submitted,
THERALD N. JENSEN
Price, Utah
EUGENE H. MAST
First National Bank Building
Grand Junction, Colorado
SENIOR & SENIOR
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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